webbsy wrote:
I think a point lost in the Red Bull Renault saga is the fact that Red Bull were against these engines in the first place. Renault basically publically held F1 hostage with their threats of leaving if they didn't get these engines.
Renault, along with the other manufacturers basically designed the rules.
I can hardly blame Red Bull for being super pissed with Renault, for they were the ones advocating heavily these engines, they were the ones that had a heavy hand in framing the rule book around the engines, and they are the ones that have so thoroughly ballsed up the very thing that they essentially held F1 to ransom over.
And they are now contemplating pulling out after being the main driving force behind bestowing arguably the most hideously complicated and expensive technology on F1 ever?
Could Red Bull have/continue to conduct themselves in a better and more professional matter? Yes, absolutely. Should Renault be surprised and feel victimized at the criticism? No.
That's fair. But then there's a way to handle situations like this and airing your dirty laundry in public is inadvisable.
To even the balance, here's a good article which talks about how Renault got into the current strife they are in. What you'll see is that you and RtN have paraphrased some of the issues:
Dieter Rencken on 17th June wrote:
Where to now for Renault?
The seed for Renault's current on-track misery was planted many years ago, writes DIETER RENCKEN, as he evaluates the options before one of F1's longest-serving and most-successful engine manufacturers
By Dieter Rencken
AUTOSPORT contributor
In deciding its Formula 1 future within the next six months, Renault admits that it faces three stark choices:
A) Withdraw totally, although this was denied as recently as March
B) Ramp up to full team ownership
C) Continue as is, ie as an engine supplier to teams
None of the above decisions will be easy, as the French company well knows from previous experience evaluating similar options during its chequered F1 history. Indeed, whatever solution this seventies-turbo-trailblazer eventually elects will be extremely painful, for apart from the impact on the 300-odd people slaving away at Renault Sport F1 (plus three times that at vendors), each option has connotations of failure.
Should Renault elect Option A) at the end of three years of lacklustre performance, characterised by fractious infighting with partner Red Bull Racing - the team with which it dominated for four straight years during the sport's V8 era - then it will be seen to have been thoroughly beaten by the hybrid technology it pushed F1 so hard to adopt, often through veiled threats of withdrawal.
It is no secret that Renault was one of the architects of the current formula, having attended all engine working group meetings, and being one of the mainstays of the 'token' system that has bitten it so hard by preventing manufacturers from restarting from scratch if they got it wrong first time around.
It is this clause that, more than any other, has scuppered Renault's F1 programme by preventing its engineers from resolving the various issues that have blighted its reputation. And unless F1 makes a massive U-turn (why should it, simply to appease companies that got it catastrophically wrong?) Renault is doomed to 'run what it brung' until 2020. Imagine the damage that will do to its reputation.
Renault has been there before, having in 1985 exited as team owner following distinct lack of championship success, before withdrawing totally from F1 a year later after a season of supplying independents with turbo power units.
It returned in 1989 with Williams and the partnership dominated the nineties, claiming five constructors' titles through between 1992 and '97, with Benetton-Renault winning the other in '95.
Then came Mercedes success, which precipitated the next withdrawal. Mecachrome, a major supplier to the programme, and then Supertec, a company operated by the colourful and controversial Flavio Briatore, supplied V10s to teams such as Williams, Benetton and BAR between 1998 and 2000.
As expected, none won a race, and, at the turn of the millennium, Renault announced its purchase of Benetton effective 2001 - with Briatore at the helm. Success soon followed, culminating in Fernando Alonso titles in 2005 and '06. Then came 'Crashgate'. The scandal meant the team was charged with wilfully causing a crash to enable Alonso to win, forcing the next withdrawal and Briatore's downfall.
The team was 'sold' (a loose term given the details) to Genii Capital for 2010, and eventually rebranded 'Lotus' amid much acrimony over both the use of the name and the team's relationship with its engine supplier. During the 2011 Brazilian GP, Renault CEO Carlos Ghosn announced that it has sold all shares in 'Lotus', and would revert to the role of engine supplier only.
Insiders said the man known as 'Le Cost Killer' after ruthlessly cutting billions out of the operating budgets of Renault (and alliance partner Nissan) - not to mention tens of thousands of jobs - had decreed the company's F1 programme should be a "profit centre and not a cost centre" in the future.
The French-Lebanese-Brazilian engineer appointed a trusted lieutenant - Jean-Michel Jalinier, a man with zero F1 experience - to run a show supplying a quartet of disparate teams. Clearly Renault Sport F1 was to Ghosn just another division, and the company's current predicament can be traced right back to decisions taken in 2010, then compounded at the end of '11.
"In a certain way you have ups and downs and you are putting all your eggs in one basket [as team owner]," he told AUTOSPORT at the time.
"You know it's not what we are looking for - we are not here to compete in F1. We are here to sustain our name, our brand, to sustain our technology, to sustain our image of a reliable car manufacturer.
"And because of this I feel much more comfortable with the strategy we have today where we are partners with, next year, four teams, providing engines and hopefully many of them are going to be very well positioned in the race. That is what I think."
Note what Renault is not in F1 for...
However, the programme was "well-positioned", for Red Bull Racing won two further titles to add to its 2010/11 haul using the tried and tested engines that had been honed to perfection before F1 introduced its engine freeze concept. Thereafter the "profit centre" simply failed to deliver the goods, mainly on account of lack of heads and leadership.
"We have 300 people at Viry [-Chatillon, the Parisian suburb in which Renault Sport F1 is based]," a senior figure said in late 2013, ahead of F1's first hybrid season.
"And we have done a Google Maps search of the parking lot at Brixworth [ie Mercedes High Performance Powertrains] and counted over 500 cars. Now, not everybody goes to work by car..."
The implication was that HPP operated with a headcount of over 500 personnel - Mercedes argues many are engaged on projects other than F1 - but, if anything, the comment proved how much Ghosn and co underestimated the task of building a competitive hybrid F1 power unit. One able to "sustain our name, our brand, our technology, our image of a reliable car manufacturer".
True, Red Bull Racing and Renault won three grands prix last year, but the fact is they were fortuitous rather than fought-for victories that depended as much on Daniel Ricciardo's opportunism as they did on Mercedes dropping the ball. Thrice. This year Renault's prospects are rather dimmer, particularly as it lost Caterham to administration and Lotus to Mercedes, and in many ways the current dilemma mirrors 1999/2000.
Which neatly introduces Option B) and a return to full team ownership despite Ghosn's comments above.
When Renault acquired Benetton at the start of the noughties, the landscape was vastly different. F1 tsar Bernie Ecclestone was very much in control, tobacco funding hung over every paddock (Renault snatched Mild Seven money), TV numbers were on the up and the sport was expanding its footprint.
What tipped the equation in F1's favour was that not only was arch-rival Peugeot (still) an engine supplier, but Renault's global competitors such as Ford, Toyota and Honda had all announced F1 plans and invested heavily in teams. Mercedes and BMW were also ramping up their involvements to include teams stakes, at a time of buoyancy in the industry.
Ghosn, then CEO of Nissan, simultaneously held the engineering vice-presidency at Renault, but ascended to the top office of both brands in 2005. Given his approach to F1, a relevant question is: Would he have blessed the Benetton purchase had he then been head honcho?
However, save for Mercedes and Honda - the latter having this year made a return as struggling engine supplier to McLaren - not a single company listed above graces current grids with all (including Renault as team owner) having departed at the first whiff of economic downturn in 2008/9, a state that still hangs over the motor industry.
Thus the need to take on direct competitors in a global arena, one currently losing followers at the rate of 10 per cent per annum, is vastly reduced. The political landscape has, of course, changed massively, so much so that Renault - despite being a major motor manufacturer - would have no guaranteed place on the Strategy Group nor gain premium shares of F1's revenues.
In May 2013, even before the full inequity of F1's Strategy Group and its associated revenue structures were revealed, this column listed the benefits of team ownership versus being an engine supplier only. Mercedes went from engine supplier to team owner in 2010, at a time Renault went the other way.
Thus the comment made by Cyril Abiteboul to AUTOSPORT this week that, "the business case is completely different when you have your own team [as opposed to being an engine supplier] as [a team] is capable of deriving some commercial income from sponsors, from FOM, from merchandising and so on", is not so much a profound statement as a profound admission of taking a wrong direction in 2010...
If anything, the playing field is now further tilted against Renault by the new structures than in May 2013. Saliently, as solely an engine supplier, Renault was excluded from all processes, and it is now virtually impossible for any Renault-owned team to become a full and permanent member of the Group unless the body is disbanded totally - which Ferrari and McLaren, among others, are kicking against.
Indeed, the only way Renault could acquire guaranteed Strategy Group status would be via the purchase of an existing permanent member (Ferrari, McLaren, Red Bull Racing, Mercedes or Williams) and retain that team's name, for one of the criteria for membership is continuous history/championship form.
Three of the five are out of reach for obvious reasons, while Williams is a listed company and hence subject to Frankfurt stock exchange regulations. Were Renault to purchase its primary partner Red Bull Racing, any change of name would present a problem.
Thus, any wonder the teams Renault admits to having conferred with are non-SG outfits such as Toro Rosso, Sauber and Force India?
Revenues, too, would present a problem. This column regularly outlines how CVC Capital Partners, majority controller of Formula One Management which owns F1's commercial rights, refuses to increase payouts to teams - not least through pressure on loans taken by the venture capital company took to acquire the rights and pay dividends to fund holders - despite at least three facing ruin.
Thus it is difficult to envisage FOM disbursing unbudgeted annual premium payments to Renault. Equally, it is impossible to envisage Ghosn accepting lesser rewards than, say, McLaren for equal (or better) results through to 2020. In fact, about the only scenario here is stalemate. For extensive background to F1's current political landscape and how the sport got itself to this utterly unsustainable situation, refer here.
Which leaves Option C), continuing as an engine supplier.
Given that the number of teams using Renault power has halved to two (RBR and sister STR) over the past 12 months - with both being openly critical of the units supplied - any increase in customer numbers is rather difficult to envisage, particularly as the regulations are unlikely to change within the next two or three years.
Indeed, Renault Sport F1 is far off reaching its target of being a "profit centre" as per the original plan, for the estimated cost of keeping Viry running is approximately £120million per annum, against which the operation currently recovers around £40million from two customers. The rest is carried by the struggling car division.
Any change to engine regulations - if/when they come - would result in cost increases. Not necessarily, though, in increased recovery from customers due to Renault's unit allegedly being the most expensive on the grid. Then, forget not that Renault has absolutely no official status in the regulatory process, while Ferrari and Mercedes hold full SG membership, and McLaren is closely aligned with Honda.
It hasn't been all smiles when Renault's Abiteboul and Red Bull's Christian Horner and Helmut Marko have crossed paths this year
Smiles have been rare when Abiteboul and Red Bull's Christian Horner and Helmut Marko have crossed paths this year © LAT
By contrast, Renault and Red Bull Racing appear to be waging open warfare, with Abiteboul this week alluding to the intra-team problems when he said: "That is one of the difficulties we have in our relationship with Red Bull.
"When you are not one single team it is more difficult to again build up the confidence in a group than when you are completely integrated.
"That's one of the things we are working on. We are trying to get Red Bull to support us rather than bash us publicly."
Indeed, if usually reliable sources are to be believed, the relationship has soured to such an extent that RBR has commenced negotiations for Ferrari engines for when its contract expires at the end of 2016. If that eventuates, STR is sure to follow unless acquired. With Honda actively seeking a second team, who would choose Renault given present circumstances?
Thus, in the final analysis, F1 should brace itself for the loss of another manufacturer. In this case a mainstream brand that supported the sport more than any other, having competed in some form or other for 34 years (Mercedes, for example, has a total of 23 years spread over three eras), during which time it scored no fewer than 12 constructor titles, either as partner or in its own right.
That is some record.
If, as now seems likely, it comes to Option C) two men must shoulder the blame: Ghosn, for myopic, cost-driven decisions taken in 2010, and Ecclestone for the profit-driven political state F1 currently finds itself in.
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